ERW CommandGovernance

THE INTELLIGENT AI GOVERNANCE LEADERSHIP PROGRAMME

Separate the claim from the permission.

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20-Session Programme · 25 Minutes Per Day · Free · For leaders in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector
WEEK 3 OF 4 · GENERATIVE SYSTEMS, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS · SESSIONS 11–15 · WORK AT YOUR OWN PACE
This week’s assessments: Pop Quiz 3 — Generative Systems and the Plant after Session 13 · Practice Exam 3 — Generative Systems, Security and Operations after Session 15
By Session 20: you hold a signed 90-Day AI Governance Plan for your own company · Every assignment marked against a published rubric · Pass mark 70
Generative Systems · Chapters 17 and 18SESSION 11
Evaluate the Generative System and Control Its Knowledge
Session 11 of 20 · 25-Minute Module

Why This Matters

Week 3 moves from models that score to systems that write, search and act. Much of the AI your company meets will arrive as an assistant: a model, a prompt, a document index, access rules and its users. A vendor will show you a fluent answer. Today I want you to ask what was tested, against which documents, at which revision and for which user. In your business the answer that matters is often a limit, an interval or a condition inside a controlled document. An assistant that quotes the wrong revision fluently is a governance problem, not a style problem. This session gives you the questions that expose the difference, and the test that proves the document boundary holds.

25-Minute Module
5:00 – 11:00
Build the task distribution and judge it honestly
  • Build a task distribution: real task categories plus a designed challenge set of routine questions, missing information, ambiguous requests, conflicting documents, superseded revisions, adversarial content and cases requiring refusal or escalation. Keep a held-out evaluation set not used to tune the prompts.
  • Define a materially wrong answer. A punctuation error and an incorrect engineering limit are not equal. Report separate rates; a harm-weighted aggregate must never conceal severe failures.
  • Groundedness asks whether a claim is supported by the retrieved evidence; correctness asks whether it is true for the task. Faithfully repeating an obsolete source is grounded but wrong.
  • For important outputs, require claim-level evaluation. A sentence with a citation is not automatically supported; the cited passage must establish the proposition.
  • When the authorised corpus is insufficient, the system should state the limitation, request the evidence or refer to a qualified person. Measure those actions, not merely how often it answers.
  • Automated judges are models needing validation. Zheng and colleagues identified position and verbosity biases [S25]. Ask for checks against expert-labelled samples, randomised answer order and audited disagreements with domain reviewers. Self-rating is not independent assurance; similar models can share a blind spot.
Ask who checked the judge.
17:00 – 22:00
Permission, freshness and the release rule
  • Retrieval metrics are not answer metrics. Recall at k asks whether relevant evidence appears among the first k retrieved items. An absent document cannot be cited; a present one can still be misused. Evaluate retrieval, generation and the end-to-end task separately.
  • Liu and colleagues found degradation in their tested settings when relevant information sat in the middle of long contexts [S27]: a reason to test placement in your system, not a universal law.
  • Permission must survive retrieval. Enforce access before content reaches the model, including cached snippets, embeddings, summaries, citations and conversation history. Test with distinct identities. The retrieval service enforces the boundary, not a prompt asking the model to be careful.
  • Freshness and withdrawal. Monitor the interval between a source change and its availability, with an action when it exceeds the limit. The knowledge owner must be able to withdraw a defective document and find where it was used.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    Evaluation is a decision method, not a contest to produce the largest aggregate number. A single reproducible permission breach may be more important than an excellent average response score.

  • Regression and release. Keep tests for known failures and a refreshed sample of current tasks. Report completion rate, safe abstention, latency, review effort and harm-relevant failures separately, and state which findings block approval.
Always ask what the denominator excludes.
Key Terms

Task distribution

Representative real task categories plus a deliberately designed challenge set, against which a generative system is evaluated.

Canary set

Constructed test documents with known conditions and access rules, used to test parsing and permissions and kept out of the production corpus.

Self-Check — Before You Submit
1. A document assistant's average score has improved, but the rate excludes refusals and retrieval failures, and a tester reproduced a contractor identity obtaining a summary of a confidential document. What do you decide?
  • A. Approve, because the average score is the strongest evidence available
  • B. Approve with a system prompt forbidding disclosure
  • C. Withhold approval until the permission breach is fixed in the retrieval service and retested, with the full denominator reported
  • D. Approve for internal users and review the breach next quarter
C. Withhold approval until the permission breach is fixed in the retrieval service and retested, with the full denominator reported — One reproducible permission breach may outweigh an excellent average, and excluding refusals overstates usefulness. The prompt fix is the trap: the retrieval service must enforce the boundary.
2. An assistant answers a question about today's work by correctly citing revision 2 of a procedure. Revision 3 is in force. How is the answer classified?
  • A. Grounded but not correct for today's decision
  • B. Correct, because it is supported by a cited source
  • C. Ungrounded, because the citation is out of date
  • D. Acceptable, because newer revisions are always preferred automatically
A. Grounded but not correct for today's decision — It is supported by the retrieved evidence, so grounded, but not right for today's task. A citation does not make an answer correct, and always preferring the newest revision fails historical questions.
3. Which use of an automated judge does the book support?
  • A. Using the evaluated model's self-rating as independent assurance
  • B. Accepting agreement among several similar models as proof of quality
  • C. Replacing domain review with the judge's confidence number
  • D. Validating the judge against expert-labelled samples, randomising answer order and auditing disagreements with domain reviewers
D. Validating the judge against expert-labelled samples, randomising answer order and auditing disagreements with domain reviewers — A judge is a model needing validation; Zheng and colleagues identified position and verbosity biases [S25]. Agreement among similar models is tempting but can share the same blind spot.

Today’s Assignment

Write Section 11 of your plan: the task distribution, groundedness test and document-control boundary for your company's assistant.
  • Name the assistant and the decisions it feeds. If you have none, use a proposal or a tool staff already use informally.
  • Write the task distribution: at least six categories, including a superseded revision, a conflicting source and a refusal case. Define a materially wrong answer for your business.
  • Choose three decision-changing claims and state the source support each needs.
  • List the document-control fields, conflict routing, identity-based permission tests and the role that can withdraw a document.
  • State the findings that would block release regardless of the average score.
  • The honest part: where does your company's document control already fail without AI, and how would an assistant inherit that failure? Aim for 400 to 900 words.
YOUR 90-DAY PLAN

Section 11 — The task distribution, groundedness test and document-control boundary for our assistant.

How this is marked — the rubric
Builds a task distribution of at least six categories that includes superseded, conflicting and refusal cases, with a defined materially wrong answer30
Separates groundedness from correctness for three named decision-affecting claims20
Specifies document-control fields, conflict routing, identity-based permission tests and a named withdrawal role30
States blocking findings and one honest existing knowledge-control weakness20
Total · pass mark 70100
Submitting session 11
Write your answer in Word or Google Docs. The first line must read Session: 11, or the submission is refused. Upload the Word file (.docx), or switch to the Google Doc tab and paste your document’s share link.
Marked against the rubric above and returned as a written letter, saved to your progress page. Do not submit until you have passed the self-check above.
Capabilities Covered
Whole-system evaluationGroundedness versus correctnessDocument control in retrievalPermission-preserving retrievalRelease-blocking findings
Tick it once you have submitted.Next: Session 12 →
Generative Systems · Chapters 19 and 20SESSION 12
Agents, Authority and Adversarial Security
Session 12 of 20 · 25-Minute Module

Why This Matters

An assistant that answers is one risk. An assistant that acts is another. The moment a model can raise a purchase order, create a work order, send an email or prepare a submission, the question changes from whether its answer is right to what it is allowed to do when it is wrong. Vendors will call many products agents. I want you to ignore the label and read the action rights. Today we cover the identity an agent carries, the controls that must sit outside the model, approval that binds to the final action, and the security tests that show whether a hostile document can push your company's system across a boundary. The test is plain: when the model chooses wrongly, what stops the consequence.

25-Minute Module
5:00 – 10:00
Controls the model cannot rewrite
  • The book's recommended limits: allowed tools, authorised destinations, spending ceilings, transaction counts, record scopes, execution time and delegation depth. Enforce them in services the model cannot rewrite. An instruction saying do not exceed the budget is not equivalent to an external budget check.
  • The action service verifies permission for each consequential call. The model saying the user authorised it is not evidence.
  • Validate business invariants: a payment service checks beneficiary and amount; a work-order service rejects changes outside the authorised asset scope.
  • Use idempotency. A timeout does not show whether the first attempt succeeded; retries need a transaction identifier and reconciliation, or the agent repeats messages and commitments.
  • OPERATIONS · THE WORKED CASE
    • Operations. A fictional upstream operator's agent drafts maintenance work orders. The work-order service, not the model, rejects any order outside the authorised asset scope.
    ENTERPRISE · THE PARALLEL
    • Enterprise. Its agent prepares a regulatory submission; the submission service requires the appropriate sign-off and preserves the record. Identical doctrine, different invariant.
For every limit in the policy, ask which service enforces it. A limit with no service is a hope.
15:00 – 21:00
Security: treat content as data
  • Security assessment identifies assets, adversaries, entry points, trust boundaries and consequences. Prompt injection is an instruction introduced through inputs or retrieved content that attempts to alter intended behaviour, directly or indirectly. OWASP treats it as a distinct application risk [S29]. A well-worded system prompt does not by itself establish a secure boundary.
  • An external email can carry a genuine instruction for a human and a malicious one for an assistant. Authority comes from the workflow. Limit consequences with access controls, narrow tools, output validation and transaction authorisation; filters help but do not prevent everything.
  • Record each attack outcome by the boundary crossed. An injection that changes an answer differs from one that discloses data or causes a financial action; an aggregate jailbreak rate conceals that.
  • Test the connected workflow on actual inputs: documents, emails, spreadsheet cells, OCR text, tool results. Test the action service independently of the model; a valid-looking transaction can still be unauthorised.
  • Supply chain and logging. Record model provenance, packages, retrieval dependencies and tools; a compromised source or poisoned memory can affect an unchanged model. Logs must reconstruct consequential actions without becoming a second sensitive data repository.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    Red-teaming treats a found exploit as evidence of possibility and severity, and failure to find one as limited coverage evidence. Each serious finding needs remediation, containment or explicit refusal of the affected capability.

Passing yesterday's attack set does not prove resistance to tomorrow's. Ask what the coverage was.
Key Terms

Idempotency

A design in which repeating the same request does not create a duplicate effect, using a transaction identifier and a reconciliation path so a timeout does not cause a second payment or message.

Excessive agency

OWASP's term [S28] for risks that arise from giving an AI system excessive functionality, permissions or autonomy.

Self-Check — Before You Submit
1. A manager approves an agent-prepared order on screen. Before execution the agent changes the supplier, saying the original was unavailable. The change looks sensible. What should the system do?
  • A. Execute, because the manager approved the purchase
  • B. Execute, because the agent explained its reason
  • C. Execute and notify the manager afterwards
  • D. Reject the changed action until renewed approval is given, because approval binds to the parameters that were approved
D. Reject the changed action until renewed approval is given, because approval binds to the parameters that were approved — The earlier approval does not necessarily authorise a changed action. A sensible-sounding reason is the trap: the model's explanation is not evidence of authority, so the change requires renewed approval tied to the new parameters.
2. A red-team exercise on your agent finds no exploit. What does that establish?
  • A. That the agent is secure against prompt injection
  • B. Limited coverage evidence about the attacks that were tried, not an estimate of deployment prevalence
  • C. That ordinary users will never trigger a failure
  • D. That the system prompt is an adequate security boundary
B. Limited coverage evidence about the attacks that were tried, not an estimate of deployment prevalence — Red-teaming reveals failure modes under a selected adversarial process. A found exploit shows possibility and severity; failure to find one is limited coverage evidence, so concluding the agent is secure overstates it.
3. Which of these is a control outside the model?
  • A. A spending ceiling enforced by the transaction service
  • B. A system prompt saying do not exceed the approved budget
  • C. The model confirming that the user authorised the payment
  • D. A content filter described as preventing all injection
A. A spending ceiling enforced by the transaction service — Controls belong in services the model cannot rewrite. An instruction in the prompt is tempting because it is cheap, but it is not equivalent to an external budget check, and the model's statement of authorisation is not evidence.

Today’s Assignment

Write Section 12 of your plan: the enforceable authority of the agent or tool-using system in your company, and the security tests it must pass before release.
  • Name the system and list every action it can take, marking each as propose or execute. If your company has no such system, use a proposal or a tool staff already connect to email, documents or transactions.
  • Name its non-human identity, its human owner, how credentials are scoped and expired, and how delegation to another agent is limited.
  • For each executing action, name the limit and the service that enforces it, and how approval binds to the final parameters.
  • Describe containment: how you stop new runs, cancel queued work, revoke credentials and prevent automatic restart, and who authorises reinstatement.
  • Write at least three adversarial tests built on inputs your business actually receives, stating the boundary each would cross.
  • The honest part: which of your company's systems today runs on an individual's broad account or relies on an instruction rather than an enforced limit. Aim for 400 to 900 words.
YOUR 90-DAY PLAN

Section 12 — The agent's enforceable authority and the security tests it must pass.

How this is marked — the rubric
Lists actions as propose or execute, each executing action with a named enforcing service30
Specifies non-human identity, human owner, credential scope and approval bound to final parameters25
Defines containment, restart authority and at least three adversarial tests on real inputs with the boundary crossed25
Names one honest case of reliance on a broad account or an unenforced instruction20
Total · pass mark 70100
Submitting session 12
Write your answer in Word or Google Docs. The first line must read Session: 12, or the submission is refused. Upload the Word file (.docx), or switch to the Google Doc tab and paste your document’s share link.
Marked against the rubric above and returned as a written letter, saved to your progress page. Do not submit until you have passed the self-check above.
Capabilities Covered
Action-rights reviewNon-human identityApproval bindingContainment and restartAdversarial testing
Tick it once you have submitted.Next: Session 13 →
Operations · Chapters 21 and 22SESSION 13
Privacy and the Industrial Engineering Boundary
Session 13 of 20 · 25-Minute Module

Why This Matters

This is the session I would not let a leader in our sector skip. The book is clear that industrial AI works inside the engineering management system, and that the engineering authority, not an AI committee, sets the operating envelope. A model that ranks inspection candidates and a function that acts on equipment are different objects, and connecting them can create a hazard neither shows alone. Nowhere in this programme is AI presented as acting on control, protective or safety functions. In the second half we turn to privacy, because your company also holds personal data, and removing names does not make it anonymous. Both halves end in the same place: a boundary you can still enforce when the model is wrong.

25-Minute Module
6:00 – 11:00
Measurements, digital twins and OT security
  • Record units, calibration, sensor location, sampling rate, missingness and communication delay. A model cannot tell a real event from an instrument fault unless the architecture and evidence support it.
  • A digital twin label does not establish fidelity, and simulated success does not replace field evidence. A machine learning estimate is not a measurement without qualification.
  • NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3 addresses operational technology security while recognising OT performance, reliability and safety requirements [S33]. The book cites it as a primary reference without reproducing its controls.
  • Separate enterprise assistants from control networks unless an approved architecture establishes the connection. The segmentation diagram must match enforced rules; test whether a compromised account can cross.
  • An assistant that needs historian readings does not automatically need write access to a controller. And you must be able to revoke the AI integration without disabling essential plant control or safety functions.
Ask to see the enforced rule, not the diagram.
16:00 – 21:00
Privacy beyond removing names
  • Privacy covers training, fine-tuning, retrieval, inference, outputs, monitoring and retention. Removing names does not make data anonymous; quasi-identifiers and linkage reveal people. Each use needs a lawful and contractual basis.
  • Disclosure. Shokri and colleagues studied membership inference [S30]; Carlini and colleagues demonstrated training-data extraction in their studied setting [S31]. These are threat categories, not proof every model exposes every record.
  • Differential privacy, plainly: the output changes only a bounded amount when one protected unit changes. Formally, M is (epsilon, delta)-differentially private if Pr[M(D) in S] ≤ exp(epsilon) × Pr[M(D') in S] + delta for all neighbouring D, D' under a defined adjacency and all output events S [S32]. Privacy loss can compose.
  • Ask who chooses the parameters, how composition is accounted, which outputs are covered and whether the implementation matches. Federated learning, encryption and synthetic data are not automatically private or anonymous.
  • Retention. Inventory prompts, embeddings, caches, memory, evaluation and fine-tuning data and logs; deleting a source may not delete derived records. Never promise removal of a trained model's influence without evidence.
  • In evaluation, use the least sensitive adequate evidence, and protect challengers: an investigation can expose a complainant.
Privacy cannot be established by a single redaction step at the start of the project.
Key Terms

Closed-loop control

A system acting directly on the process it observes, needing separate analysis of dynamics, delays and failure behaviour.

Membership inference

An attack that tries to infer whether a particular record was included in a model's training data [S30].

Self-Check — Before You Submit
1. A ranking model under the bounded release has performed well. The team proposes automatically deferring required inspections for low-ranked items. What do you do?
  • A. Approve, because the model's track record supports it
  • B. Refuse it within the existing release; deferral was excluded, so expansion needs a new decision and evidence contract under the engineering authority
  • C. Approve for one equipment family only, since the release already covers one family
  • D. Approve, provided an engineer can override the deferral
B. Refuse it within the existing release; deferral was excluded, so expansion needs a new decision and evidence contract under the engineering authority — The bounded release excludes deferral of required inspection. A good record is evidence for ranking, not permission for a new action, and an override option does not make the effect negligible.
2. An enterprise reporting assistant needs plant historian readings. Which architecture fits the book?
  • A. Direct connection to the control network so the data is current
  • B. Shared credentials with the operations team to save integration time
  • C. Write access to the controller in case corrections are needed
  • D. An approved, authenticated, read-only interface, tested and revocable without disabling plant control or safety functions
D. An approved, authenticated, read-only interface, tested and revocable without disabling plant control or safety functions — Needing historian readings does not mean needing write access to a controller. Shared credentials or a direct connection are the convenient trap.
3. A vendor says its model is trained with differential privacy, so your HR data is fully protected. What is the most useful response?
  • A. Ask who set the parameters, how composition is handled, which outputs are covered and whether the implementation matches
  • B. Accept the claim, because differential privacy is a formal guarantee
  • C. Reject the vendor, because differential privacy is never effective
  • D. Ask only whether names were removed before training
A. Ask who set the parameters, how composition is handled, which outputs are covered and whether the implementation matches — Differential privacy is precise only when adjacency, mechanism and parameters are specified, and loss can compose. Accepting the label is the trap; it never promises nothing can be inferred.

Today’s Assignment

Write Section 13 of your plan: the privacy controls and the advisory-versus-control boundary for any plant-facing AI use in your company.
  • Name the system and its decision pathway. If your company has no plant-facing AI, use a proposal under consideration or a tool staff already use informally on operational data.
  • State the boundary as the bounded release does: permitted, not permitted, who verifies against which procedure, and what needs a new decision.
  • Name the engineering authority that owns the envelope, the change process that model and vendor updates must enter, and the fallback if the system or its data fails.
  • List where personal data lives, including derived records, the basis for each use, and who decides retention.
  • The honest part: where in your company has an advisory tool, a spreadsheet or a report already gained influence over an operating decision it was never approved for. Aim for 400 to 900 words.
YOUR 90-DAY PLAN

Section 13 — Privacy controls and the advisory-versus-control boundary for any plant-facing use.

How this is marked — the rubric
States permitted and not-permitted uses, with no AI role on control, protective or safety functions, and a named verifier30
Names the engineering authority, the change route for model and vendor updates, and a tested fallback25
Maps personal data including derived records, with a basis for each use and a retention owner25
Identifies one honest case of a tool exceeding its approved influence20
Total · pass mark 70100
Submitting session 13
Write your answer in Word or Google Docs. The first line must read Session: 13, or the submission is refused. Upload the Word file (.docx), or switch to the Google Doc tab and paste your document’s share link.
Marked against the rubric above and returned as a written letter, saved to your progress page. Do not submit until you have passed the self-check above.
ASSESSMENT NOW OPEN

Pop Quiz 3 — Generative Systems and the Plant opens now. Sit it before you start the next session — it is how you find out whether the doctrine landed, and the practice papers may be resat as often as you like.

5 questions · 10 minutes · covers Sessions 11–13 · pass mark 70
Sit Pop Quiz 3 →Closed book, no notes, and Coach Ritchie switches himself off while you sit it.
Capabilities Covered
Advisory versus controlEngineering authorityOT boundaryManagement of changePrivacy beyond redaction
Tick it once you have submitted.Next: Session 14 →
Operations · Chapters 23 and 24SESSION 14
Human Oversight and Buying AI
Session 14 of 20 · 25-Minute Module

Why This Matters

Two comfortable phrases end many AI debates in executive meetings: a human will review it, and the vendor has tested it. Neither is evidence on its own. Oversight is a workflow property: a competent person with the relevant information, enough time and the authority to change the outcome. Procurement is the moment your company either makes a vendor's uncertainty visible or buys it silently. Today you learn to size review capacity, read override rates honestly, give people a real route to challenge, and turn a vendor conversation into a record of evidence accepted, commitments obtained and concessions accepted by a named person. Both halves share one test: can the control actually be exercised when it matters.

25-Minute Module
6:00 – 12:00
Automation bias and the right to challenge
  • People defer to a confident system or relax after repeated success. Design for examination, not rapid approval, and avoid ritual justification boxes filled with stock phrases.
  • An override rate of zero is a diagnostic question: a reliable system, weak reviewers, low-risk cases or a poor override mechanism. A high rate also has several readings. Examine sampled decisions and known-error tests.
  • Independent evidence. Give reviewers a route to source records independent of the model's summary; if the assistant supplies both recommendation and evidence, one retrieval error shapes the whole review.
  • Contestability. For consequential decisions about people, provide someone able to reconsider, and say how a concern is submitted. A human alternative that cannot handle the workload or repeats the score is no remedy. Never penalise a challenger.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    Give operators permission to suspend reliance when a safety or integrity concern appears. The stop should preserve evidence and trigger review, not require the operator to prove a population-level defect first.

  • OPERATIONS · THE WORKED CASE
    • Operations. At a fictional terminal, a supervisor sees a ranking that contradicts the readings in front of her and suspends reliance. Her stop preserves evidence and opens a review.
    ENTERPRISE · THE PARALLEL
    • Enterprise. A candidate challenges a screening outcome; the reviewer examines the basis and new information, not the same score. Both routes fail if people fear retaliation.
Ask when someone last stopped reliance on a system here, and what happened to them afterwards.
17:00 – 22:00
Contract terms as operating controls
  • Contract terms are operating controls. Test whether each right can be exercised: an audit right excluding the relevant subcontractor, or an exit right without data export, protects little.
  • Topic (Appendix E)Commitment soughtDecision if unavailable
    Permitted purposeDefined data and action scopeNarrow use or decline unsupported authority
    Material updatesNotice and relevant configuration evidenceLocal regression and restriction plan
    Incident assistanceTimely evidence and named response routeRecord investigation limits and exposure
    Data handlingSpecific retention and training-use termsRestrict information classes or select another service
    Audit evidenceRelevant scope and practical accessAlternative assurance with explicit limitation
    ExitExport, revocation and transition supportCosted contingency or rejected dependency
  • Record achieved, partially achieved and conceded terms. For each material concession name the accepting authority, mitigating control and review date. Qualified counsel drafts enforceable clauses; the table is a negotiation method, not legal drafting. No contract transfers all accountability.
  • Count total cost, including evaluation, assurance and exit, and map shared dependencies: several products may rely on one model provider.
  • The book's procurement example: a document assistant whose model cannot be pinned is restricted to drafting, with controlled retrieval, regression checks and user verification before external use. That can be a reasoned decision. It is not approval of autonomous regulatory submissions.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    Good procurement makes uncertainty visible before the contract is signed and keeps the vendor relationship inside the release and monitoring process afterwards.

Every concession needs a name beside it and a date to look again.
Key Terms

Automation bias

The tendency to defer to a confident system or become less vigilant after repeated success, which interface and workflow design must counter.

Material concession

A contract term sought but not obtained, recorded with the accepting authority, the mitigating control and a review date.

Self-Check — Before You Submit
1. Reviewers overrode the AI zero times last quarter. The sponsor calls this proof the model is excellent. Your response?
  • A. Agree and reduce the review team
  • B. Conclude that review has stopped and suspend the system
  • C. Treat it as a diagnostic question and examine sampled decisions and known-error test results before drawing any conclusion
  • D. Ask reviewers to override more often to show they are engaged
C. Treat it as a diagnostic question and examine sampled decisions and known-error test results before drawing any conclusion — Zero overrides can reflect a reliable system, weak reviewers, low-risk cases or a poor mechanism. Concluding success or failure is the trap; sampled decisions and seeded-error tests decide.
2. A vendor's document assistant cannot be pinned. The business wants it to file regulatory submissions without review. Which decision fits the book?
  • A. Approve autonomous submissions, because the vendor's uptime commitment is strong
  • B. Restrict it to drafting, with controlled retrieval, regression checks and user verification before external use, and record the concession
  • C. Reject all use, because unpinned models can never be governed
  • D. Approve, provided the contract transfers accountability to the vendor
B. Restrict it to drafting, with controlled retrieval, regression checks and user verification before external use, and record the concession — The book shows that restricting an unpinnable assistant to drafting can be a reasoned decision, but not approval of autonomous submissions. Uptime says nothing about correctness, and no contract transfers all accountability.
3. An agent produces 500 consequential proposals each hour; the review team can examine 30. What follows?
  • A. The design must limit output or narrow authority, because only 6% can be examined
  • B. A policy requiring review of all proposals is sufficient
  • C. Reviewers should approve faster to clear the queue
  • D. Sample a few proposals and approve the rest unexamined
A. The design must limit output or narrow authority, because only 6% can be examined — A policy requiring review cannot manufacture capacity. Faster approval or arbitrary sampling leaves most consequential proposals unexamined, so the design itself must change.

Today’s Assignment

Write Section 14 of your plan: the review capacity, contestability route and vendor evidence your company will demand for its AI system.
  • Name the system and its reviewers. If your company has no AI system yet, use a proposal under consideration or a tool staff already use informally.
  • Estimate output against genuine review capacity and state what reviewers must see.
  • Describe the route to challenge and how operators can suspend reliance.
  • Using Appendix E, list the evidence you will demand from the vendor and, for at least three negotiation topics, the decision if the commitment is unavailable.
  • The honest part: where in your company is review currently a signature without the information, time or authority behind it. Aim for 400 to 900 words.
YOUR 90-DAY PLAN

Section 14 — Review capacity, contestability and the vendor evidence we will demand.

How this is marked — the rubric
Quantifies output against review capacity and specifies what reviewers must see25
Defines a workable contestability route and a protected right to suspend reliance25
Specifies vendor evidence and decisions-if-unavailable for at least three Appendix E topics, with named accepting authorities30
Identifies one honest case of review without capacity or authority20
Total · pass mark 70100
Submitting session 14
Write your answer in Word or Google Docs. The first line must read Session: 14, or the submission is refused. Upload the Word file (.docx), or switch to the Google Doc tab and paste your document’s share link.
Marked against the rubric above and returned as a written letter, saved to your progress page. Do not submit until you have passed the self-check above.
Capabilities Covered
Review capacity sizingOverride-rate diagnosisContestability designEvidence-based due diligenceNegotiation record
Tick it once you have submitted.Next: Session 15 →
Assurance · Chapters 25 and 26SESSION 15
Monitoring, Incidents and Independent Assurance
Session 15 of 20 · 25-Minute Module

Why This Matters

Approval is not the end of governance. It is a set of conditions that must remain true. This session closes Week 3 with the three disciplines that keep them true after launch: monitoring that watches outcomes and authority rather than uptime alone, incident response that contains before it explains everything, and independent assurance that tests what controls actually do. The book makes two points that leaders often miss. An AI incident can happen with no model defect at all. And restart is a new decision, with a named authority, not the end of an outage. By the end you will write your company's incident response, restart rule and assurance sample, and Practice Exam 3 opens.

25-Minute Module
5:00 – 10:00
Severity follows consequence; contain first
  • The book's proposed severity system prioritises serious physical harm, material unauthorised action, sensitive disclosure and consequential adverse treatment. Lesser service defects follow an ordinary operational route. Specific legal reporting thresholds and deadlines must come from the applicable instruments.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    An AI incident can arise without a model defect. A correct answer delivered to an unauthorised user is an incident. A correct recommendation executed twice can be an incident. A retrieved obsolete procedure can cause harm even when faithfully used.

  • The incident record separates confirmed facts from hypotheses. A confident early diagnosis can misdirect containment.
  • Contain before explaining everything. Responders may restrict the capability, revoke credentials, isolate a source or return work to an approved process. A model rollback does not undo messages sent or decisions applied to people.
  • OPERATIONS · THE WORKED CASE
    • Operations. A fictional gas company's field assistant retrieves a superseded procedure and a crew follows it. No model defect; still an incident. Isolate the source and return work to the approved procedure.
    ENTERPRISE · THE PARALLEL
    • Enterprise. Its legal assistant gives a correct answer from a document the user may not see: a sensitive disclosure. In both, severity follows consequence, not defect.
Ask your team to name the incident that happens when the model is right. If they cannot, show them this step.
15:00 – 21:00
Assurance that tests what controls do
  • Independence is a governance arrangement, not another tool or model reviewing the work. Define scope, criteria, population, sampling and limitations; a policy audit is not a technical validation.
  • Walk through a real decision. Trace one outcome backwards to authority, configuration, inputs, revisions and approval, comparing operated and tested states. Then forward: is monitoring adequate, are expiry triggers enforced, can a responder stop it?
  • Sample controls, not only documents. Observe a permission denial, a source withdrawal, a rollback. A policy budget limit may not be enforced. A clean small sample is no enterprise-wide guarantee.
  • Reproducibility. Preserve what is needed to rerun the evaluation, or for hosted services the identifiers, prompts, evidence and outputs. A perfectly repeatable wrong calculation remains wrong.
  • Findings need an owner, due date, interim restriction and closure evidence verified by someone able to challenge it. A well-documented but ineffective control is still a finding.
  • THE DOCTRINE

    Phrases such as independently reviewed are incomplete without who reviewed what, against which criteria and with which access. Precise scope builds credibility more effectively than an impressive label.

A management-system auditor has not validated model safety unless that was actually in scope. Ask.
Key Terms

Incident commander

The person assigned under a defined authority to direct an incident response from activation through containment, preservation and exposure assessment.

Assurance scope

The stated criteria, population, sampling, access and limitations of a review, which determine what its conclusion can and cannot support.

Self-Check — Before You Submit
1. An agent sent a draft order to an unapproved address. The team rolled back the model and wants to restart today because the vendor says it is patched. What do you require?
  • A. Restart now, because the rollback removed the cause
  • B. Restart now and monitor closely for a week
  • C. Keep the service contained until the vendor provides a written explanation
  • D. Treat restart as a new decision: reconcile actions, test fixes including send permissions, and have the named authority approve return
D. Treat restart as a new decision: reconcile actions, test fixes including send permissions, and have the named authority approve return — A rollback does not undo messages already sent, and an unrestricted send tool may be the real control failure. A vendor explanation alone is the tempting wrong answer; restart needs tested corrective actions and a named authority.
2. A report shows strong accuracy calculated only on cases with known outcomes; most recent cases are pending. What is the problem?
  • A. None, because known outcomes are the most reliable evidence
  • B. A rate calculated only from quickly resolved cases can be biased; the report should state the delay and the proportion of labels still pending
  • C. Pending cases should be counted as correct until proven otherwise
  • D. The report should be replaced by availability and latency figures
B. A rate calculated only from quickly resolved cases can be biased; the report should state the delay and the proportion of labels still pending — Delayed outcomes may not be a random subset, so excluding them can distort performance. Treating pending cases as correct hides the gap, and uptime measures say nothing about correctness.
3. A vendor's pack says the product was independently reviewed, citing a management-system certification. What should the board be told?
  • A. Who reviewed what, against which criteria and access, and that it does not show model safety unless in scope
  • B. That the product has been independently validated as safe
  • C. Nothing, because certification is a technical matter
  • D. That certification transfers assurance responsibility to the vendor
A. Who reviewed what, against which criteria and access, and that it does not show model safety unless in scope — The board should receive the assurance conclusion and its limits. A management-system auditor should not be represented as having validated model safety unless that was in scope, so the reassuring label is the trap.

Today’s Assignment

Write Section 15 of your plan: the incident response, restart rule and assurance sample for the AI system in your company.
  • Name the system. If your company has no AI system yet, use a proposal under consideration or a tool staff already use informally.
  • Write three monitoring indicators with an owner and the response each triggers, and how delayed outcomes are reported.
  • Adapt Appendix G: activation route, incident commander, first containment action, notification owners and reinstatement authority.
  • Define your assurance sample: one decision to walk in both directions, three controls to observe operating, and who will review with what competence and independence.
  • The honest part: describe the last time an issue in your business was declared fixed when only the description changed, or was restarted without anyone named as the authority. Aim for 400 to 900 words.
YOUR 90-DAY PLAN

Section 15 — Our incident response, restart rule and assurance sample.

How this is marked — the rubric
Defines monitoring indicators with owners, responses and treatment of delayed outcomes20
Adapts the runbook with a named commander, a first containment action and a named restart authority30
Specifies a two-direction walkthrough, three observed controls and the reviewer's competence and independence30
Gives one honest case of description-only closure or unauthorised restart20
Total · pass mark 70100
Submitting session 15
Write your answer in Word or Google Docs. The first line must read Session: 15, or the submission is refused. Upload the Word file (.docx), or switch to the Google Doc tab and paste your document’s share link.
Marked against the rubric above and returned as a written letter, saved to your progress page. Do not submit until you have passed the self-check above.
ASSESSMENT NOW OPEN

Practice Exam 3 — Generative Systems, Security and Operations opens now. Sit it before you start the next session — it is how you find out whether the doctrine landed, and the practice papers may be resat as often as you like.

15 questions · 25 minutes · covers Sessions 11–15 · pass mark 70
Sit Practice Exam 3 →Closed book, no notes, and Coach Ritchie switches himself off while you sit it.
Capabilities Covered
Outcome monitoringConsequence-based severityContainment firstRestart authorityControl sampling
Tick it once you have submitted.Next: Session 16 →
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